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Abstract 
Many political scientists and economists have addressed the implications of the public 
sector’s sheltered status on their unions’ wage strategies vis-à-vis the government.  Since the 
public sector is a monopoly provider of necessary and price inelastic services, conventional 
wisdom suggests that public sector unions’ push for wage increases which their productivity 
does not merit, exacerbating inflation and fiscal deficits.  The argument in this paper 
challenges this conventional view, and maintains that the recent, puzzling rise in public 
sector wage inflation, relative to that in manufacturing, in Euro-zone countries is an 
unintended result of the institutional shift towards European Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU).  During the 1980s and 1990s, differences in wage inflation between the manufacturing 
and public sector within most EMU candidate-countries were low.  After 1999, these 
differences significantly worsened; wage moderation continued in the manufacturing sector 
while wage inflation arose in the public sector.  It is argued here that monetary union’s 
predecessors, the European Monetary System and Maastricht regimes, imposed two 
important constraints on public employers, which enhanced their ability to enforce wage 
moderation: the commitment to a hard currency policy via participation in the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism, adopted by some earlier than others and, the Maastricht criteria.  Monetary 
union’s removal of these two constraints weakened public employers’ capability to deny 
inflationary wage settlements to public sector unions.  Panel regressions results outline a 
statistically significant relationship between monetary union and higher levels of wage 
inflation in the public sector, relative to manufacturing. The paper concludes with a brief 
discussion of the implications of monetary union for inter-sectoral dynamics.    
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The Revenge of Baumol’s Cost 
Disease?:  Monetary Union and the 
Rise of Public Sector Wage Inflation 
 
The current fiscal crisis in Europe and the rush of governments to impose fiscal 
austerity measures suggest that little bodes well for Europe’s public sector 
employees.  With fiscal deficits in some countries reaching levels unseen since the 
Second World War, governments are attempting to reduce public spending to 
compensate for significant financial sector bail-out packages.  One such attempt in a 
number of European Union (EU) countries is proposed legislation to limit wages of 
public sector employees.  Considerable opposition to such legislation has arisen from 
public sector unions, that have resorted to general strikes to protest governments’ 
cost-saving measures.  Given the accompanying economic downturn, however, 
public opinion of unions’ hostility is mixed.  In some countries, economists perceive 
stringent cuts as necessary to correct excessive public sector pay imbalances.1  Public 
opinion in countries that are net contributors towards the EU’s €750 billion bail-out 
package has demonstrated little sympathy for public sector employees in the euro-
zone’s peripheral economies, and foresee IMF- and EU- induced reductions in public 
pay and employment as necessary measures to enforce moderation. 
Many scholars in political science and economics have addressed the implications of 
the public sector’s sheltered status on their unions’ wage strategies vis-à-vis the 
government.  Since the public sector is a monopoly provider of necessary and price 
inelastic services, conventional wisdom suggests that public sector unions’ push for 
wage increases which their productivity does not merit, exacerbating inflation and 
                                                        
1 Referencing that fact that Irish public sector pay had risen to unsustainable levels, economics 
professor Phillip Lane proclaimed that “We were in such a big hole that we did a lot relative to 
other countries, but not a lot relative to the gap we have to close” (Gentleman, 2010).   
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fiscal deficits.  The argument in this paper challenges this conventional view, and 
maintains that the recent rise in public sector wage inflation, relative to that in 
manufacturing, in Euro-zone countries is an unintended result of the institutional 
shift towards European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).  From a historical 
perspective, differences in sectoral wage inflation (measured as Blanchard’s wage-in-
efficiency unit, real wage growth minus changes in labour productivity) within the 
EMU10 between the sheltered, public sector and the exposed, manufacturing sector 
were relatively low during the 1980s and the early and mid-1990s (see Figure 1 and 
Table 1).2  Only in the late 1990s did these differences increase; wage restraint 
continued in the manufacturing sector, while wage inflation in public-services rose.   
Figure 1: Wage Inflation by Sector for the EU10 (Unweighted Average), 1980-2007 
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The introduction of EMU appears to have coincided with significant sectoral 
divergence within its member-states.  Were such developments linked or merely 
coincidental?  This question merits exploration for two reasons.  First, lack of sectoral 
divergence prior to late 1990s in EMU countries is puzzling in light of what has been 
                                                        
2 Greece and Luxembourg are excluded.  Wage and productivity data for the manufacturing 
sector (ISIC category D) and the public sector (an employment-share, weighted composite of 
public administration and defense, education, and health and social work, ISIC categories L, M 
and N respectively) come from the EU KLEMS database.  Sectoral data is available until 2007. 
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said in the literature on sectoral interests.  Much of the political debate which 
emerged in the 1990s discussed the consequences of excessive rent capture by public 
sector unions for centralisation.  The experience most referred to was that of Sweden 
in the 1970s and early 1980s (Lash, 1985; Thelen, 1993; Iversen, 1996; Pontusson and 
Swenson, 1996).  The inclusion of the low-productivity, public sector in centralised 
wage agreements not only placed an inflationary squeeze on the export sector, but 
also limited how much manufacturing employers could pay their (more productive) 
workers.  In contrast to Sweden, however, several EMU10 governments imposed 
austerity measures to enforce pay-freezes, or pay-cuts, on the public sector during 
the 1980s, while all EMU10 governments imposed major fiscal austerity measures 
during the 1990s in order to qualify for Maastricht.  In addition to limiting public 
sector pay, governments in Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands placed restrictions, or outright suspensions, on pay indexation during 
the 1980s.3  These experiences provide a sharp contrast to that witnessed in Sweden, 
which has emerged as a poster child of public sector militancy gone wrong.   
Second, this divergence merits exploration because it suggests that EMU may have 
coincided with a redistributional shift between sectors.  10 years since its inception, 
workers in the exposed, manufacturing sector for most EMU countries (Italy, Spain 
and Portugal being the notable exceptions) continue to exert significant wage 
restraint, while workers in the public sector enjoy persistent wage inflation.  Though 
public sector union leaders deemed such wage increases necessary, in order to bridge 
the private/public sector pay divide, manufacturing unions, in the presence of 
market constraints, remain limited in what they can bargain for.  Even amidst the 
current European debt-crisis, public sector unions continue to drag their feet.4  While 
such crises should provoke deterioration in the nominal exchange rate, either via 
depreciation or devaluation, providing some assistance to the export sector, a 
common currency precludes this option, leaving exposed sector unions and 
employers helpless to adjust.  Consequently, in order to guarantee national 
                                                        
3 EIRR 135 (April, 1985): “Pay indexation”, pg. 23-25 
4 “Unions across Europe protest over cuts”, Financial Times.  29 September 2010. 
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competitiveness, exposed wage setters must either wait for public sector adjustment, 
or compensate for public sector excess via further restraint.     
The argument developed here to explain the sudden emergence of sectoral wage 
inflation divergence within the EMU10 hinges on comparing monetary union to the 
institutional constraints in place under its predecessors.  The pre-EMU regime, the 
European Monetary System’s Exchange Rate Mechanism (1979-1998) and Maastricht 
regime (1992-1998), imposed two restrictions upon public employers that facilitated 
the enforcement of wage moderation upon public unions; a hard currency policy and 
the Maastricht deficit criteria.  Under the European Monetary System (EMS), 
countries were forced to peg their currencies to the German Mark, shadowing 
Germany’s anti-inflationary monetary policy.  The eventual shift to a hard currency 
policy depended on upon public employers’ ability to thwart inflationary wage-
settlements.  Stubborn adjustment to monetary non-accommodation, while of 
relative insignificance to public sector unions whose jobs are shielded from business 
cycle dynamics, holds significant consequence for governments whose continued 
appeasement of public sector wage inflation can prolong contractionary pain.  Once 
the commitment to a hard currency policy was made, public sector compliance was 
required to fulfil adjustment, and, due to its lower productivity, involved lower 
wage allowances compared to those granted in manufacturing.  In 1992, the 
Maastricht budgetary criteria placed further pressures on public sector employers, 
particularly in the ERM’s “peripheral” economies who pursued softer currency 
stances during the 1980s, to limit public sector pay rises.  Consequently, wage 
inflation in public services, relative to the manufacturing sector, was restrained 
under the EMS (1979-1998) and Maastricht (1992-1998) periods.      
Monetary union, however, removed these two constraints, leaving public employers 
with few external hands-tying devices.  The absence of a hard currency commitment 
or Maastricht’s exclusionary threat did little to affect exposed-sector employers, as 
competitiveness pressures continued to constrain their price mark-ups.  Employers 
in the public sector, on the other hand, were left to negotiate with large 
service/public sector unions who had little to gain from wage moderation.  While the 
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Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) imposed similar rules as Maastricht, penalties for 
breaching its terms failed to hold the same political clout as Maastricht’s 
exclusionary-threat.  Suffering consolidation fatigue, governments inherited a weak 
bargaining position against public sector unions, becoming less able to deny 
inflationary wage demands.   
The next section presents a brief review of the literature on central banks, wage 
inflation and monetary union, and sectoral divergence.  Section II presents the 
theoretical argument.  Sections III outlines the contextualisation of the dependent 
and independent variables, the model used to test the theory, and the empirical 
results.  A brief discussion about monetary union’s impact on sectoral cleavages, and 
its implications for wage adjustment, concludes. 
 
I. Monetary Union, Trade Unions, and Sectoral Wage 
Interests 
Wage-setting behaviour under monetary union received much attention, both before 
1999 and after.  Some argued that in EMU, with its asymmetric structure consisting 
of a centralised monetary policy and separate wage-bargaining systems, national 
wage-setters would no longer be constrained in their wage demands by inflation-
averse monetary authorities.  Once monetary policy was transferred to the European 
Central Bank (ECB), national unions would pursue high wage increases (Hall and 
Franzese 1998; Iversen and Soskice 1998; Cukierman and Lippi 2001; Hancké and 
Soskice, 2003). The creation of the ECB significantly reduces the size of individual 
wage setters in relation to the central bank, moving national-level wage-setting 
towards a situation in which national labour unions are strong enough to extract 
high wage increases yet small enough not to bear the full cost of inflation (Calmfors 
and Driffill 1988). 
These arguments were rooted in analysis on the impact of non-accommodating 
central banks on wage setters’ decisions to control their wages.  Scharpf (1991) was 
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one of the first to advance the notion that a conservative/monetarist government 
limits wage decisions of self-interested unions.  An accommodating government 
committed to the pursuit of full employment is fundamentally defenceless against 
uncooperative unions, because it cannot respond to aggressive wage claims with 
contraction.  However, once monetary non-accommodation is delegated to the 
central bank, wage moderation on the behalf of unions ceases to be a concession, and 
becomes a “self-interested union response” (Scharpf, 1991; 172).  If central banks are 
non-accommodating, enforcing an inflationary rule or shadowing a central bank that 
has one, the unemployment costs of inflationary wage settlements increase, 
prompting unions to exert greater restraint in their wage demands (Hall, 1994; 
Iversen 1998; Iversen 1999a and 1999b; Franzese, 2001).  Consequently, many 
scholars anticipated that the removal of EMS’s Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and 
the Maastricht inflation criteria, which enhanced national central banks’ inflation-
aversion, would provoke wage inflation by unions. 
While these arguments provide a clear explanation on why wage moderation 
increased considerably across EMU-candidates prior to 1999, they fail to provide a 
clear picture of what occurred under monetary union.  At the aggregate level, wage 
inflation did not increase across the board, and for certain sectors (manufacturing) 
wage moderation continued.  Only for the majority of EMU’s sheltered sectors did 
wage excess ensue.  Literature on sectoral economic interests poses multiple reasons 
why sheltered sectors witness greater wage excess than exposed ones.  In the 
economics stream of this literature, dominated by the work of William Baumol, 
sectoral divergence arises simply due to productivity differentials (Baumol and 
Bowen, 1965; 1966).  Wages at the national level tend to rise and fall together, yet 
sector productivity does not.  Some sectors, services, experience static productivity 
growth while others, manufacturing, experience higher productivity growth.  The 
political science stream of this literature focuses on competition’s impact on 
employers’ price mark-up strategies (Crouch, 1990; Iversen, 1996, Iversen 1999a).  
Inflationary wage increases produce lower unemployment costs for public 
employees than those in manufacturing, because increased labour costs can be 
financed through taxes or deficit spending rather than employment-shedding.  
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Garrett and Way (1999) outlined the macroeconomic consequences that significantly 
large public sector unions pose, in that their pursuit of significant wage increases has 
significant repercussions on the exposed sector. 
Whether the divergence in Figure 1 can be attributed to wage developments or 
developments in productivity, can easily be gauged by examining wage growth 
trends on their own. The Balassa-Samuelson effect suggests that increased trade 
integration increases productivity in sectors exposed to international markets.  As a 
result, wage actors in these sectors push for higher wages, leading to similar 
demands in sheltered sectors where productivity growth remains low; hence, higher 
(sheltered sector) wage inflation arises.  However, data provided in Figure 2 suggests 
that what changed after 1998 was not simply labour productivity, but the setting of 
wages.  Differences in nominal hourly wage growth between the manufacturing and 
public sector were significantly higher in the 1979-1998 (ERM) and 1992-1998 
(Maastricht) periods than the EMU period.  In some countries (Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany and the Netherlands) manufacturing hourly wage growth 
exceeded that in the public sector by 1% per annum over the entire 1979-1998 period.  
After 1998, differences in hourly wage growth between manufacturing and public 
services decreased for all countries except Austria and Germany.  Some countries 
(France, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain) witnessed complete inversion, from 
higher wage growth in the manufacturing sector between 1979 and 1998, to higher 
wage growth in the public sector under EMU.      
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Figure 2:  
Difference in Manufacturing and Public Sector Nominal Wage Growth (period averages) 
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                   Source Data: EU KLEMS 
The above literatures provide numerous explanations for sectoral wage inflation 
divergence, yet fail to address why we witness an increase in divergence for the 
EMU10 under monetary union.  The lateness of divergence is puzzling because, if 
anything, increased privatisation and competition in the public sector should have 
rendered public sector unions less, not more, able to demand inflationary wage 
increases relative to their manufacturing counter-parts.  It is argued here that sectoral 
convergence, which occurred under monetary union’s predecessors, EMS and 
Maastricht, can be best understood if we contextualise the institutional constraints 
that these regimes place on public employers.  ERM placed an important institutional 
constraint upon governments, which altered their bargaining strategies with public 
sector unions: a hard currency policy, enforced by non-accommodating central 
banks.  Hard currency policies increase the unemployment costs of inflation, albeit 
not necessarily for the public sector.  Given the public sector’s relative lack of 
exposure to these increased unemployment costs, it is unsurprising that public sector 
unions have little incentive to moderate wages in response to a monetary threat.  
Governments, however, care a great deal about unemployment developments in the 
private sector.  Of course, Governments can avoid such unemployment consequences 
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associated with inflationary public sector settlement via tax-financing.  Such moves, 
however, bring political repercussions, particularly under monetary tightening.   
Secondly, because hard currency commitments generally are internally-chosen 
(under a fixed exchange rate, decisions to follow a hard, versus soft, currency stance 
often fall upon domestic political actors rather than international ones) governments 
are likely to accommodate such policy shifts in the fiscal realm.  Put otherwise, hard 
currency regimes are pointless if fiscal laxity impedes on central banks’ ability to 
carry them out.  Governments that make the commitment to a hard currency stance 
do so understanding the fiscal consequences involved in upholding their 
commitments, particularly in the presence of relatively open capital markets.  This is 
not to say that all ERM participants committed themselves to fiscal adjustment in 
1979.  Monetary adjustment occurred at different times for different countries.  
Regardless of time differences, however, the process of monetary adjustment 
required the inflationary effects of budgetary spending to be limited.  In the 1990s, 
the exclusionary threat of the Maastricht budgetary criteria further increased the 
costs of excessive public sector wage settlements to public employers.  Subsequently, 
public employers’ continued to impose restraint upon the public sector in order to 
fulfil EMU entry-requirements.  Monetary union’s removal of these two constraints 
weakened public employers wage bargaining power, and established a setting where 
public sector unions were able to extract more significant rent capture than their 
exposed counter-parts.    
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II. A Theory on Monetary Union and Sectoral 
Divergence 
The discussion of the pre-EMU era as an institutional construct which facilitated 
public sector wage restraint begins with the assumption of a dual-sector economy 
consisting of an exposed sector (of which manufacturing, ISIC category D, serves as a 
proxy) and a public sector (of which a composite of public administration and 
defence, education, and health and social work, ISIC categories L, M and N 
respectively, serves as a proxy).  Employers and unions in the exposed sector face a 
competitiveness-constraint, given their presence in international markets, and 
therefore are confronted with a high demand elasticity for their goods.  This implies 
that price mark-up responses to wage inflation are limited, because increased prices 
lead to a greater fall in quantity demanded.  Given that competition increases 
unemployment costs associated with wage increases, unions in the exposed sector 
have incentive to exert wage moderation.  Employers and unions in the public sector, 
on the other hand, are presented with no competition.  They are monopoly suppliers 
and because public services are universally provided, it is difficult to suggest that 
their producers face any type of price elasticity, though higher spending on such 
services eventually imposes higher tax burdens.  Due to the state’s ability to tax and 
run deficits, actors in this sector face softer budget constraints than those in the 
private sector.  Public sector unions have the least to gain in restraining their wages, 
employment wise, as domestic demand for public services is relatively fixed 
(Iversen, 1996; Franzese, 2001).  Based upon these foundations, the theoretical 
argument is outlined below. 
EMU’s institutional predecessors introduced two pivotal institutions, one in 1979 
and one in 1992, that facilitated governments’ commitment to delivering wage 
moderation in the public sector; the EMS’s Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and the 
Maastricht budgetary criteria.  In regards to the former, the selection of the German 
mark as the anchor of the ERM implied that national central banks were forced to 
shadow the Bundesbank’s interest rate policy in order to avoid their currencies 
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sliding against the Deutschmark.5  Consequently, membership in the ERM meant 
that national monetary policy shadowed that in Frankfurt.  The success of the strict 
adherence to the exchange rate peg, however, depended just as crucially on the 
cooperative behaviour of trade unions and their pursuit of responsible wage 
settlements (Hassel, 2003).  Trade union cooperation could either be consensual, or in 
the case of public sector unions, forced.  The “stickiness” of union adjustment in 
several EMU member-states, partially the result of employers’ reluctance to impose 
moderation in the presence of union militancy, resulted in wide variation towards 
the adoption of a credible commitment to the ERM.  Figure 3 provides a variation of 
Iversen’s (1999a) monetary non-accommodation index for seven countries which 
participated in the EMS since its inception (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands) as well as Austria, which held a separate peg 
arrangement with the Deutschmark, and Finland, which pegged its currency to a 
(Deutschmark double-weighted) basket in the early 1980s.  The index is an average of 
the normalised Cukierman (1992) central bank legal independence index and 
normalised four year moving averages in the nominal effective exchange rate, a 
proxy for market confidence in the success of conservative monetary policy (Iversen, 
1999a; Dornbusch, 1979).  Values range from 0 to 1, with higher values being 
associated to more non-accommodating (conservative) monetary regimes.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
5 While Austria was not a formal member of the EMS, it adopted a hard currency peg policy with 
Germany during the 1970s (Hochreiter & Winckler, 1995).   
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Figure 3: Central Bank Non-Accommodation (1979-1998) 
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Time-variant modification of Iversen’s (1999a) non-accommodation index.  Source Data: CBI 
Index: Cukierman, 1992 and Polillo and Gullién, 2005;  Nominal Effective Exchange Rate data 
from AMECO Database 
Some countries – Austria, Denmark, and the Netherlands – adopted credible 
commitments towards hard currency stances early in the ERM regime.  The 
Netherlands entered the ERM with a hard currency policy vis-à-vis Germany already 
in place; the country undertook only one devaluation prior to the 1992 crisis, a 
meagre 2% in 1983.  Austria, likewise, made two (minor) devaluations in the late 
1970s and early 1980s; since 1981, there was minimal fluctuation between the two 
currencies (Hochreiter & Winckler, 1995: 93).  Denmark intensified its commitment to 
a hard current policy under the ERM after 1983 and France’s last (major) devaluation 
with the German Mark, around 6%, took place in 1986 (Weber, 1991: 65-66).  Such 
developments are visible in Figure 3 with the gradual increase in Denmark’s non-
accommodation index in the early 1980s, and France’s in the mid-1980s.  Walsh 
(1999) claims that Italian monetary adjustment began in 1988, although Weber (1991) 
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doubts whether Italy moved away from its soft currency policy during the 1980s.  
The early years of the ERM, 1979-1983, were marked by multiple currency 
realignments, yet the frequency of these alignments slowed after 1984; between 
January, 1987 and September, 1992, realignments were few and minor (McNamara, 
1998).   
After the 1992 ERM crisis, the ERM’s exchange rate bands were widened to ±15%.  
The strictness of the Maastricht inflation criteria, however, replaced the (looser) ERM 
constraint, further reinforcing inflation targeting objectives across all EMU candidate 
countries’.  The Maastricht criteria imposed two conditions on candidate countries, 
which improved central bank non-accommodation.  Firstly, it forced countries to 
adopt a strict inflation target; inflation could be no higher than 1.5% of the EMU’s 
three best performers.  Secondly, it prompted governments in some countries to 
reform their banking laws and enhance legal independence.  In response to criteria 
established in the Maastricht Treaty, Belgium, France and Italy reformed their 
banking legislation, increasing the legal independence of their central banks near to 
that exhibited by the Bundesbank (Polillo and Guillén, 2005).  These banking reforms 
account for the sudden rise in central bank non-accommodation for all three 
countries in 1992 seen in Figure 3.  Only in Finland did monetary non-
accommodation continue to deteriorate after 1993, due to a crippling recession, 
which initiated a 13% depreciation in the currency once it left the ERM in 1992; when 
the country rejoined the ERM in 1996, monetary conservatism was pursued.      
As central banks increased their commitments to a hard-currency/anti-inflationary 
policy, employers became more restricted in the wage settlements they could grant 
to their employees.  If a shadow country’s inflation rate significantly increased 
relative to Germany’s, threatening the peg, central banks would be forced to 
intervene via monetary tightening.  While monetary tightening poses obvious 
demand and investment consequences for employers, and unions, in the 
manufacturing sector, several debate whether monetary non-accommodation 
similarly affects public sector trade unions (Iversen, 1999a; Franzese, 2001).  Yet both 
Iversen and Franzese neglect the effect of monetary conservatism on governments’ 
The Revenge of Baumol’s Cost Disease?  
 
 
14
incentives to grant excessive wage settlements.  The responsibility that follows a 
currency pegged to a non-inflationary currency, such as the Deutschmark, is that 
governments’ capacity to maintain it depends on its ability to avert inflationary 
pressures with fiscal policy (Fischer, 1987).  Transitions towards hard currency 
policies are generally not externally thrust upon governments.  Rather, commitments 
to such policies often involve decisions made by domestic political actors.  If there is 
doubt about government’s ability to defend its currency’s value on grounds of 
prolonged deficit spending, higher interest rates (a risk premium), stifling demand, 
will result.  Of course, deficits do not have to result from excessive public sector pay 
settlements, if governments are able to increase taxes or decrease other social 
transfers.  Monetary non-accommodation, however, increases the political costs of 
such a move.  In the event that the private sector is forced to moderate its wages to 
facilitate labour market adjustment to a monetarist regime, increasing taxes or 
reducing benefits to accommodate public sector pay excess would not bode well for a 
government’s popularity.6  Especially for (rightist) business-friendly governments, 
the imposition of wage moderation on the public sector provides a more convenient 
alternative in limiting reproach from the central bank.   
Governments which made early transitions to a hard currency peg under the ERM 
discontinued accommodating fiscal policies alongside the adoption of credible hard 
currency policies.  The Belgian government introduced a number of special powers 
laws, which enabled it to not only dismantle its wage indexation system for all 
employees, but also restrict the salary level of newly employed civil servants to 80% 
of their normal salary in their first year of employment.7  In the Netherlands, 
Lubbers’ coalition implemented a public sector pay freeze in 1983, and a further 3% 
nominal public pay cut in 1984.8  In Denmark, Schülter’s centre-right coalition 
abandoned its goal of full employment after it pegged its currency to the Mark, 
                                                        
6 The Netherlands provides a case in point.  In September 1982, after Government imposed 
numerous measures to restrict national pay agreements, the Christian Democratic Party 
campaigned on introducing civil servant pay freezes before the general election (EIRR 105 
(October, 1982), “Focus on job creation”, pg. 4)   
7 EIRR 98 (March 1982) “Pay indexation modified”, pg. 4; EIRR 120 (January, 1984), “Reduced 
working time in the public sector”, pg. 3. 
8 EIRR 108 (January 1983), “Incomes policy and pay bargaining”, pg. 13-14; EIRR 120 (January 
1984), “Public service dispute ends”, pg. 5. 
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adopting a formidable bottom line: “any changes in wages and prices that were 
incompatible with the fixed exchange rate policy would be met by a tightening of 
monetary policies and hence a rise in unemployment” (Iversen 1996: 419).  Real wage 
cuts in the public sector followed in 1985.9  
A more symmetrical fiscal threat towards public sector wage militancy came in 1992 
with Maastricht’s budgetary criteria.  For most governments, the trade-off between 
EMU exclusion and enforcing further wage moderation on the public sector was an 
easy decision to make, but one which generated considerable unrest amongst labour 
unions.  The adjustment to Maastricht’s fiscal constraints proved difficult for even 
the core Deutschmark bloc countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands) where monetary adjustments and fiscal adjustments had been 
undertaken in the 1980s.  Belgium introduced a finance bill in 1997 that not only cut 
welfare and increased taxes, but also placed ceilings on public sector pay rises.10 In 
France, the Juppé plan, aimed at meeting the EMU convergence criteria by limiting 
public sector pay among other measures, drew considerable social unrest from 
unions, while in Germany, the introduction of austerity packages aimed at cutting 
public sector pay and public spending also witnessed union opposition.11  In Austria, 
public sector workers were forced to accept pay rises of 0.3% in 1996 (compared to 
2.4% increases in the private sector and a 1.9% rise in inflation), due to austerity 
measures introduced in the 1996/97 budget aimed at complying with Maastricht.12  
For employers in high-inflation, peripheral economies, cuts in public sector pay were 
more dramatic, and fiscal adjustments for some countries involved a resurgence in 
national social pacts.  Italy and Finland witnessed dramatic reductions in real 
compensation of public employees.  During the 1980s, average, annual, real 
compensation growth in the public sector was 5.22% in Finland and 4.06% in Italy; 
this figure declined to 1.4% and 0.97%, respectively, for the entirety of the 1990s 
(AMECO Database, 2010).  In Italy, the Ciampi Protocol in 1993 reorganised the 
fragmented public sector pay system and introduced a series of ceilings on public 
                                                        
9 EIRR 136 (May 1985), “Government imposes two-year pay settlement”, pg. 11-12. 
10 EIRR 277 (February 1997), “EU social partners consider the impact of EMU”, pg. 19-21 
11 Ibid 
12 EIRR 279 (April 1997), “Collectively agreed pay rose by 2.4% in 1996”, pg. 4. 
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sector pay (Hassel and Ebbinghaus, 2000; Hancké and Rhodes, 2005).  In 1998, the 
Greek Government passed a taxation bill which contained a controversial clause to 
curb collective bargaining rights in loss-making public sector utilities, granting 
Parliament the ability to intervene and unilaterally legislate on restructuring in the 
event of a bargaining stalemate.13   
Monetary union was not intended to significantly alter Maastricht’s/EMS’s non-
accommodating design.  The ECB was just as conservative, if not more so, as the 
central banks that shadowed the Bundesbank’s anti-inflationary policy prior to 1999.  
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), too, stipulated identical excessive deficit 
procedures as the Maastricht budgetary criteria.  Yet, while the content of EMU was 
similar to the EMS/Maastricht regime, the context significantly differed.  Little 
changed for exposed sector wage bargaining actors under EMU; competitiveness 
pressures continued to limit employers’ ability to increase prices, forcing unions to 
further moderate wages.  Public employers, however, were devoid of two crucial 
constraints which enabled them to enforce wage moderation on the public sector.  
Under a single currency, a hard currency policy at the national level becomes 
obsolete.  Governments could no longer rely upon a conservative, national monetary 
authority to monitor low inflation amongst national labour unions.   
There were some attempts to extend Maastricht’s budgetary constraint into the EMU 
design.  The SGP was created to enforce fiscal discipline in the Euro-area in order to 
safeguard the credibility of the ECB (Buti et al, 1998; Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 
1998).  While the Pact itself was not specifically intended to limit public sector pay 
excess, it was designed to continue to tie governments’ hands, which may have 
otherwise been inclined to re-engage with expansionary fiscal policies.   In practice, 
however, penalties associated with breaking the SGP were different from those of 
breaking the Maastricht criteria.  After 1999, the SGP replaced Maastricht’s 
exclusionary consequences with softer fines.  The time scale for compliance was also 
less urgent: member-states had two years to correct fiscal excesses before their 
                                                        
13 EIRR 289 (February, 1998), “New taxation bill provokes disputes”, pg. 7; EIRR 290 (March, 
1998), “Controversial taxation bill passed”, pg. 8. 
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mandatory deposits were transformed into financial penalties (Eichengreen and 
Wyplosz, 1998: 68).  In EMU’s early years, scholars pointed to considerable 
consolidation fatigue to explain why governments were unsuccessful in moderating 
fiscal expansions (Von Hagen, 2003; Alesina et al, 2008).  Once EMU entry eliminated 
the exclusionary threat, large deficits reappeared in several members countries, and 
the SGP was widely violated and eventually reformed.   
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, public sector unions were forced to bear the brunt 
of fiscal adjustment to the ERM and Maastricht.  Conditions of the Maastricht 
budgetary criteria were absolute: failure to meet the 3% deficit limit would result in 
EMU exclusion.  However, Maastricht’s weakness lay in the fact that it was finite.  
Public employers could afford to dictate austerity in the name of monetary union, yet 
once entry was secured, it could no longer utilise the urgency of fulfilling the 
Maastricht criteria as an excuse for fiscal austerity.  Employers’ negotiating strength 
significantly improved under the Maastricht years, because public sector wage excess 
could potentially block EMU entry.  Once entry was obtained, however, public sector 
adjustment was turned on its head.  With the monetarist threat removed from the 
national level, and no further possibility for externally-imposed exclusion, public 
employers entered EMU on the defensive. 
 
III.  Empirical Model: Did EMU produce a trend-break? 
Figures 1 and 2 provide a summary of sectoral wage dynamics in relation to the 
introduction of monetary union, yet lack the inclusion of other factors which could 
have contributed to the rise in wage inflation divergence.  In this section, a time 
series analysis is employed to test whether, in the presence of economic and 
institutional controls, EMU was significantly associated with sectoral wage 
divergence across its member-states.     
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III.1 Conceptualising the dependent and independent variables 
 The most widely used measurement of wage inflation across recent, yet limited, 
empirical scholarship on unemployment dynamics and shifts in the wage curve 
(Estevão, 2005; Simoni, 2007; Baccaro and Simoni, 2010) is Blanchard’s wage-
efficiency-unit (WEU; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Blanchard, 2006).  Blanchard’s 
WEU is equal to the change in the real product wage minus the change in labour 
productivity, the latter defined as the change in total factor productivity minus the 
change in the labour share of GDP.  Measurements of wage inflation used in this 
paper will also rely on Blanchard’s efficiency wage formula, with changes in gross 
value added per hour worked used as a measurement for labour productivity.14 
Labour’s share in sectoral output is not used in the construction of the dependent 
variable itself, but rather is used as a separate control in the regressions, in order to 
determine how varying degrees of capital augmentation across sectors influences 
variation in sectoral wage inflation over time.  Sectoral wage inflation is defined as 
the percentage change in the sectoral real hourly wage minus the percentage change 
in sectoral gross value added per hour worked.  Data on compensation of employees, 
number of hours worked and gross value added was obtained from EU KLEMS. 
The theoretical model outlined above is a relative one, not an absolute one.  It is not 
public sector wage inflation that is the primary variable of interest, but rather public 
sector wage inflation relative to manufacturing.  The dependent variable, relative 
public sector wage inflation, is constructed as the difference between public sector 
wage inflation and manufacturing wage inflation.  Percentages are expressed from 1 
to 100 rather than from 0 to 1.15  If this value is negative, wage restraint persists in the 
public sector relative to manufacturing, indicating that government has kept wage 
inflation in the public sector below that in manufacturing.  If this value is positive, 
wage inflation persists in the public sector relative to manufacturing.  Table 1 
                                                        
14
 Labour’s share in total factor productivity is not available at the sectoral level. 
15
 Percent-change independent variables are measured in a similar fashion. 
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provides period averages of the dependent variable for the eight EMU and six non-
EMU countries included in the sample.16  
Table 1: Relative Public Sector Wage Inflation (Period Averages) 
 
 
1979-1989 
Average 
1990-1998 
Average 
1999-2007 
Average 
Austria  3.62 1.93 3.80 
Belgium  2.60 3.06 2.88 
Finland  4.27 3.79 7.75 
France  -0.82 2.88 2.73 
Germany  0.17 -0.09 1.24 
Ireland  4.61 7.12 10.33 
Italy  4.9 2.02 0.27 
Netherlands  0.16 2.00 3.70 
EMU Average 2.44 2.84 4.09 
Australia  1.9 0.86 1.65 
Denmark  0.75 0.42 1.54 
Japan  4.43 1.84 2.19 
Sweden  1.8 4.76 6.16 
UK  2.82 1.92 3.07 
US 4.06 3.64 4.07 
Non-EMU 
Average 2.63 2.24 3.11 
Source Data: EU KLEMS Database 
The independent variable of interest is the presence or absence of monetary union.  
Monetary union, as an institutional change, is defined in a binary fashion: 1 for 
countries that are exposed to monetary union at time t, 0 for countries that are not.  
Given the theory above, it is expected that the monetary union dummy should hold a 
positive correlation with relative public sector wage inflation; countries under EMU 
should have higher divergence between public and manufacturing wage inflation, 
ceteris paribus, than countries outside monetary union.     
 
 
 
                                                        
16 Spain and Portugal are excluded from the regression analyses due to the lack of fiscal data 
before 1995.   
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III.2 The empirical model: A panel-data analysis 
Compared to standard wage models, relative wage models, notably sectoral ones, 
have not been extensively developed.  It is therefore difficult to depart from a 
benchmark.  Estevão (2005) uses two separate empirical models to examine the 
impact of product market regulation on aggregate wage moderation; one using the 
change in unemployment rate as the core macroeconomic control, and another using 
real GDP growth.  Because Estevão’s dependent variable is an aggregate one, it is 
suitable to utilise aggregate macroeconomic variables for controls.  However, though 
it is possible to obtain data on the number of people employed in a given sector from 
the EU KLEMS database, unemployment rates are unavailable by sector.  Therefore, 
the model presented will utilise sectoral controls, where possible, and 
macroeconomic controls where relevant sectoral variables are impossible to obtain or 
calculate.  Keeping these considerations in mind, the baseline empirical model is the 
following: 
yi,t  =    α   +   β1(MU Dummyi,t)  +   Σ βkXk,i,,t +  Σ βmZm,i,t  +  εi,t 
where yi,t is relative public sector wage inflation for country i at time t, MU Dummyi,t 
is the monetary union dummy for country i at time t, Σ Xk,i,,t is a vector of economic 
controls, and Σ Zm,i,t is a vector of institutional controls.  Fourteen countries are 
included in the sample, eight EMU members and six non-members: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, the UK and US.  Non-EMU countries are included in the sample to ensure 
that sectoral wage inflation divergence is not simply a time-trend phenomenon.  Two 
different panels were run; one for 1992-2007 (presented in Table 2), in order to 
compare the EMU period to Maastricht, and one for 1979-2007 (presented in Table 3) 
in order to simultaneously compare the ERM and Maastricht regimes against EMU.    
Economic controls include real GDP growth, change in the export share, net public 
borrowing, the change in labour share ratios between the public and manufacturing 
sector, and the change in employee ratios between the public and manufacturing 
sector.  The beta coefficient on GDP growth should be positive; public sector unions 
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should be better positioned to secure higher wage settlements, relative to 
manufacturing, in booms rather than busts.  Data on real GDP growth was obtained 
from the OECD’s Main Economic Indicators.  The sign on the beta coefficient of the 
change in export share should also be positive; increases in the export share result in 
greater exposure to trade, which should prompt manufacturing wage-setters to 
restrain wages relative to their public sector counter-parts.  Data on export shares 
was obtained from the European Commission’s AMECO database.  The beta 
coefficient on net public lending should be positive; deficits (negative balances) 
should prompt Governments to limit public sector wage increases.  Net public 
lending was run on a lag, in order to avoid endogenity problems.  Data on fiscal 
deficits were obtained from European Commission’s AMECO database, with the 
exception of Australia and Sweden, whose (more complete) deficit data was obtained 
from the OECD.17   
In regards to sectoral economic controls, the change in labour share ratios between 
the public and manufacturing sector is included to account for differences in capital 
substitution between sectors.  Greater wage militancy may prompt employers to 
switch away from labour inputs towards capital, which in turn will affect unions’ 
wage demands.  However, it is more difficult for employers to shift towards capital 
in labour-intense outputs (i.e. services) than capital intensive ones (i.e. 
manufacturing).  In order to control for the impact of differences in capital 
substitution, the change in the ratio of the public sector’s labour share to total output 
over manufacturing’s labour share is included.  This variable is also run on a lag, due 
to endogenity issues.    The beta coefficient for the (lagged) change in labour share 
ratio should be positive.  As the labour share in the public sector relative to the 
manufacturing sector increases, indicating greater capital substitution in 
manufacturing, relative public sector wage inflation should also increase.  Finally, 
the change in the employee ratio between the public and manufacturing sector is also 
included to control for different employment trends within sectors.  The sign on this 
variable is ambiguous, as it is difficult to determine whether employment dynamics 
                                                        
17 AMECO public accounts data was more complete for the remainder of the sample than fiscal 
data from the OECD. 
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are driven by supply or demand factors.  Data for both labour share and number of 
employees by sector was obtained from EU KLEMS database. 
Institutional and political controls used include wage coordination, centralisation, 
trade union density, (right-wing) government composition and fiscal centralisation.  
The beta coefficient on wage coordination should be positive.  Wage coordination 
produces wage growth compression, particularly at the bottom of the income 
distribution where coordinated union bargaining exists on wage floors (Kahn, 1998).  
Hence, public sector wage growth should be closer to manufacturing under higher 
levels of wage coordination, than lower levels of wage coordination.  Centralisation 
is also included.  A linear term was included although regressions were also run with 
a linear and quadratic term.18  Given that centralisation has been found to be linearly 
correlated with wage inequality (see Wallerstein, 1999), the sign on centralisation 
should be positive.  Higher levels of centralisation should lead to more compressed 
wage growth.  The beta coefficient on trade union density should also be positive, 
given trade union density’s positive correlation with wage compression (Machin, 
1997; Rueda and Pontusson, 2000).  Finally, it is expected that right-wing government 
composition, measured as the proportion of cabinet seats occupied by right-wing 
parties weighted by the number of days the government is in office, as well as fiscal 
centralisation, measured as the proportion of tax revenue of central government to 
total taxation, should be negatively correlated with relative public sector wage 
inflation.  Right-wing governments, and central governments with greater control 
over public revenues, should be more conducive to enforcing public sector wage 
moderation.  Wage bargaining institutional data was taken from the AIAS ICTWSS 
database; the wage coordination measure in the dataset is an updated version of 
Kenworthy’s (2003) index while the centralisation measure is constructed in a similar 
manner to Iversen’s (1999a).  Data on cabinet composition and fiscal centralisation 
was taken from the Comparative Political Economy Data Set.  Because the latter only 
has political data from 1990 onwards, cabinet composition and fiscal centralisation 
were excluded from the 1979-2007 panel. 
                                                        
18 This was done to account for the Calmfors-Driffill (1988) hypothesis.  In both cases, 
centralisation failed to possess a significant coefficient.   
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Aside from the above controls, an interaction term between trade union density and 
the change in public to manufacturing employee ratio was included to control for 
Garrett and Way’s (1999) hypothesis that larger public sector unions are better able 
to secure excessive wage growth.  Ideally, this interaction term would be between 
public sector union density and relative public sector employee growth.  Sectoral 
data on union density, however, is scant at worst and patchy at best.  Garrett and 
Way rely upon Visser’s (1991) data on union membership by ISIC sector 
classification, yet Visser’s data is limited to five individual years, the last of which is 
1988.  Trade union density is used as a rough proxy for public sector union density.  
While this variable is (ambitiously) used as a proxy public sector union strength, it is 
the only indicator of rough comparability which possesses relative completeness 
across the sample.  The beta coefficient on this interaction term should be positive.  
The impact of high relative employment growth in the public sector on relative 
public sector wage inflation should be higher in countries with high, rather than low, 
(public) trade union density.   
One control that was purposely excluded was a measure of central bank non-
accommodation.  Though its omission is problematic, given the centrality of a hard 
currency policy to the theory outlined above, there is one significant methodological 
caveat with including either central bank independence (measured via Cukierman’s 
legal index) or a more time-variant monetary non-accommodation (measured via 
Iversen’s index) within the panel regressions; they are highly correlated with the 
monetary union dummy.  Since all EMU countries inherited the ECB as their 
monetary authority after 1998, and hence, have identical CBI/non-accommodation 
indices after 1999, there is near perfect correlation with both measures of monetary 
conservatism and monetary union.19  Regressions were run, including these 
measures, individually, with monetary union.  The inclusion of Iversen’s monetary 
non-accommodation index failed to impact the significance or sign of the monetary 
                                                        
19 Pair-wise correlations between Cukierman’s CBI and the monetary union dummy are 0.80 (p-
value = 0.000) and 0.86 (p-value = 0.000) for the 1979-2007 and 1992-2007 samples, 
respectively, while those between Iversen’s non-accommodation index and monetary union are 
0.70 (p-value = 0.000) and 0.80 (p-value = 0.000) for the 1979-2007 and 1992-2007 samples, 
respectively.     
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union dummy (the index itself was insignificant).  Inclusion of Cukierman’s CBI 
index eliminated monetary union’s significance.  CBI did not possess a significant 
coefficient, yet the beta coefficient was positive, indicating that higher CBI is 
associated with greater relative public sector wage inflation.  This positive coefficient 
is unsurprising given the correlation, not causation, between sectoral wage inflation 
divergence under EMU coupled with the ECB’s strong legal independence (0.9 out of 
1).   
An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression method with panel corrected standard 
errors (PCSE) was applied to test the baseline model above, which enables one to 
correct for both country-specific heteroskedasticity and spatial correlation of errors 
(Beck and Katz, 1995).  A baseline model was first run with a GLS estimator, but an 
LR test confirmed the presence of panel heteroskedasticity (Wald test: chi2(19) = 
54.66).  The test for no serial correlation could not be rejected, so all models included 
a lag of the dependent variable in order to control for auto-correlation.  Some 
question the inclusion of a lag as a proper method of testing auto-correlation, as it 
can cause a serious (downward) bias in OLS’s estimators, due to its absorption of 
large parts of trend (see Achen, 2000 and Plümper et al, 2005 for excellent critiques of 
the “standard” Beck and Katz method).  Plümper et al (2005) report that a Prais-
Winsten (AR1) transformation neither fails auto-correlation tests nor shows spherical 
distribution of errors, yet manages to absorb less time-series dynamics than a 
dependent lag.  A Prais-Winsten (AR1) transformation did not alter the significance 
of monetary union’s beta coefficient for any of the models presented, yet produced 
slightly higher coefficient values (between 2% and 8% higher) than the inclusion of a 
lag.  Consequently, because the lag method of auto-correlation control produces 
more conservative estimates, its coefficients are presented instead.  As a further 
robustness check, OLS regressions were also run using country clustered standard 
errors (CSE), which produces larger (i.e. less forgiving) standard errors than PCSEs 
(column IX and VII in Tables 2 and 3, respectively; Rogers, 1993; Williams, 2000). 
Country dummies were included in order to control for country-specific omitted 
variables; an F-test of country dummies in both time-panels confirmed that they 
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belong in the (one-way fixed effect’s) model’s specification.20  Time dummies were 
excluded for two reasons.  Firstly, their inclusion poses obvious multicollinearity 
problems with the monetary union dummy.  Plümper et al’s (2005) critique of 
country dummy inclusion (that they eliminate “too much” cross-sectional variance, 
and reduce significance of time-invariant controls, such as institutions, that may be 
specific to countries) applies equally to the inclusion of time dummies when 
measuring the impact of institutional shifts on breaks in trend.  Secondly, joint F-tests 
for both panels confirmed that the time dummies were insignificant.21   
In both time panels, the monetary union dummy holds the proper sign and remains 
highly significant, regardless of controls or estimation method used.  Monetary 
union also maintains its significance when a time trend, which is not significant, is 
controlled for, indicating that the rise in public sector relative wage inflation is not a 
time-related phenomenon across the entire sample but rather is concentrated within 
EMU countries after 1999.  EMU’s beta coefficient is not significantly different 
between the 1992-2007 and 1979-2007 panels, offering further evidence that 
divergence after 1998 was not merely a Maastricht effect, but was also a departure 
from fiscal adjustments made in the 1980s.  Regarding economic controls, GDP 
growth and change in the export share hold consistent significance across all models, 
with the correct sign.  The change in public to manufacturing employee ratio is 
significantly positive, indicating that greater employee growth in the public sector 
relative to the manufacturing sector produces higher relative public sector wage 
inflation.  This result could be driven in part by the “Garrett and Way” hypothesis; 
public sector inflation, relative to manufacturing rises when its share of employees, 
relative to manufacturing rises, due to higher bargaining power that accompanies a 
larger employee base; the significance with of its interaction with trade union density 
certainly suggests this would be the case.  The lag of relative labour share ratio is 
significant across all models, but holds the improper sign, indicating that more 
                                                        
20 Chi2(13) = 73.54, prob > chi2 =  0.0000 for the 1992-2007 panel and chi2(13) = 67.58,  prob > 
chi2 =  0.0000 for the 1979-2007 panel. 
21 Chi2(15) = 12.64, prob > chi2 =  0.6224 for the 1992-2007 panel and chi2 (28) =   23.73; prob > 
chi2 =  0.5914 for the 1979-2007 panel. 
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intensive use of labour inputs within the public sector relative to the manufacturing 
sector leads to lower relative public sector wage inflation.   
Strangely, all institutional controls fail to hold significance, bar one.  The interaction 
between trade union density and the change in public to manufacturing employee 
ratio, holds a significant, positive sign, supporting Garrett and Way’s (1999) 
hypothesis.  Trade union density is weakly significant, with the improper sign, but 
only when its interaction with the change in relative employee ratio is included in 
the 1992-2007 panel.  When a time trend is included in the 1979-2007 panel, trade 
union density’s sign becomes positive, although it still remains insignificant.  The 
“Garrett and Way” variable’s interaction with the EMU dummy (not included in the 
tables below) failed to produce a significant coefficient, although its individual 
components remained significant.  Other controls’ interaction with the EMU dummy 
were also insignificant (including interactions between EMU and bargaining 
institutions), indicating that divergence occurred in all countries, regardless of 
collective bargaining structure. 
The results of the right-wing government composition pose a slight anomaly.  If the 
monetary union dummy is excluded from the 1992-2007 panel, the term has a 
significant, positive coefficient with relative public sector wage inflation, indicating 
right wing governments produce greater wage inflation in the public sector than left 
wing governments.  When the monetary union dummy is included, its significance 
wanes; yet when an interaction term between the two is included, it enhances the 
significance of the hierarchal terms without the interaction being significant itself 
(see Column VII, Table 2).  Such strange positive correlation between right-wing 
governments and relative public sector wage inflation could be explained by one of 
two factors. One is the shared positive and statistically significant relationship of 
right-wing governments and the monetary union dummy with the time trend. While 
both variables have little correlation with each other over the entire panel (the pair-
wise correlation between right-wing cabinet composition and the monetary union 
dummy is -0.02, with a corresponding p-value of 0.973), both variables are positively 
significant with a general time-trend across the entire sample (right governments and 
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monetary union hold a pair-wise correlation of 0.17, p-value = 0.009, and 0.54, p-
value = 0.000 with the time-trend variable, respectively).  Hence, the positive 
coefficient could be driven by a shared positive trend over time between the rightist 
government and relative public wage inflation, although it is important to stress that 
right-government’s relationship with the time-trend is reflective across the entire 
sample, including the six non-EMU participants which did not witness similar 
divergence trends in wage inflation as the EMU countries.  Alternatively, the positive 
relationship between relative public sector wage inflation and right-wing 
governments could be explained by class alliances; public sector unions may be more 
willing to exercise wage moderation under leftist governments than rightist ones.       
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Table 2: Regression results for Public Sector Wage Inflation (1992-2007) 
 
Independent Variables I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
                   
Lag 0.163* 0.172** 0.163* 0.153* 0.155* 0.17** 0.18** 0.159* 0.15** 
  (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.087) (0.086) (0.086) (0.085) (0.087) (0.063) 
Monetary Union Dummy 1.52*** 1.50*** 1.53*** 1.12** 1.15*** 1.38*** 1.90*** 1.08** 1.54*** 
  (0.407) (0.414) (0.407) (0.456) (0.425) (0.390) (0.596) (0.499) (0.516) 
GDP Growth 0.67*** 0.66*** 0.67*** 0.65*** 0.71*** 0.70*** 0.71*** 0.65*** 0.67*** 
  (0.129) (0.130) (0.129) (0.129) (0.130) (0.126) (0.127) (0.132) (0.150) 
Export Share Growth 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 
  (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) 
Fiscal Deficit (Lag) -0.029 -0.018 -0.036 -0.070 -0.111 -0.031 -0.031 -0.050 -0.032 
  (0.081) (0.086) (0.080) 0.080 (0.080) (0.079) (0.078) (0.083) (0.106) 
Change in Relative  0.39*** 0.38*** 0.39*** 0.38*** 0.101 0.38*** 0.40*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 
Employment  (0.086) (0.082) (0.086) (0.087) (0.126) (0.086) (0.085) (0.087) (0.079) 
Change in Capital  -0.20*** -0.21*** -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.20*** 
Accumulation (Lag) (0.054) (0.051) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.073) 
Centralization   3.492               
    (5.855)               
Wage Coordination     0.129             
      (0.391)             
Trade Union Density       -0.096 -0.115*         
        (0.070) (0.070)         
TU Density * Change         0.007**         
Relative Employment         (0.003)         
Right Government           0.008 0.011**     
            (0.005) (0.005)     
Fiscal Centralisation           0.006 -0.002     
            (0.065) (0.067)     
Right Government *            -0.015     
Monetary Union Dummy            (0.016)     
Time Trend               0.061   
                (0.048)   
Constant -0.484 0.595 -0.626 0.819 1.455 -1.282 -1.203 0.216 -0.416 
  (0.797) (1.906) (0.938) (1.219) (1.252) (2.954) (2.978) (2.491) (0.593) 
Method PCSE PCSE PCSE PCSE PCSE PCSE PCSE PCSE CSE 
Time Dummies No No No No No No No No No 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 237 233 237 236 236 237 237 236 237 
Number of Countries 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Wald chi squared Stat 454.1*** 424.9*** 455.8*** 552.3*** 471.8*** 663.7*** 820.8*** 492.1*** 129.4*** 
R Squared 0.5309 0.5259 0.5318 0.5385 0.5488 0.5374 0.5433 0.5497 0.522 
Model used was an OLS method, including an AR1 term, with PCSE/CSE from 1991 to 2007.  N-1 country dummies 
included but not shown.  Standard errors are in parenthesis.  *, **, and *** indicate significance on a 90%, 95% and 99% 
confidence level. 
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Table 3: Regression results for Public Sector Wage Inflation (1979-2007) 
 
Independent Variables I II III IV V VI VII 
                
Lag 0.133** 0.138** 0.133** 0.133** 0.131** 0.130** 0.166** 
  (0.062) (0.063) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.061) (0.063) 
Monetary Union Dummy 1.515*** 1.489*** 1.522*** 1.505*** 1.579*** 1.254*** 1.473*** 
  (0.388) (0.396) (0.388) (0.456) (0.471) (0.489) (0.456) 
GDP Growth 0.688*** 0.679*** 0.672*** 0.688*** 0.706*** 0.711*** 0.676*** 
  (0.108) (0.110) (0.108) (0.109) (0.109) (0.108) (0.164) 
Export Share Growth 0.210*** 0.209*** 0.207*** 0.210*** 0.192*** 0.184*** 0.211*** 
  (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.052) 
Fiscal Deficit (Lag) 0.004 0.009 -0.019 0.003 -0.026 -0.033 0.004 
  (0.065) (0.067) (0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.064) (0.078) 
Change in Relative 0.266*** 0.260*** 0.263*** 0.267*** -0.017 -0.045 0.269*** 
 Employment (0.071) (0.070) (0.071) (0.072) (0.121) (0.123) (0.078) 
Change in Capital  -0.163*** -0.165*** -0.158*** -0.163*** -0.159*** -0.162*** -0.167*** 
Accumulation (Lag) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.055) 
Centralisation   0.361           
    (4.173)           
Wage Coordination     0.340         
      (0.242)         
Trade Union Density       -0.001 -0.020 0.015   
        (0.047) (0.047) (0.058)   
TU Density * Change         0.006*** 0.007***   
Relative Employment         (0.002) (0.003)   
Time Trend           0.045   
            (0.031)   
Constant 0.619 0.565 0.276 -2.678 1.433 0.226 0.506 
  (0.734) (1.438) (0.795) (1.296) (1.093) (1.468) (0.776) 
Method PCSE PCSE PCSE PCSE PCSE PCSE CSE 
Time Dummies No No No No No No No 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 372 368 372 371 371 371 372 
Number of Countries 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Wald chi squared Stat 227.4*** 225.0*** 223.8*** 226.8*** 236.5*** 244.9*** 240.8*** 
R Squared 0.3385 0.3359 0.342 0.3383 0.3487 0.3518 0.3528 
Model used was an OLS method, including an AR1 term, with PCSE/CSE from 1979 to 2007.  N-1 country 
dummies included but not shown.  Standard errors are in parenthesis.  *, **, and *** indicate significance on a 
90%, 95% and 99% confidence level. 
 
Jack-knife analyses were conducted on the baseline model (Column I), excluding 
individual countries and years, to test whether the monetary union dummy’s 
positive significance was not driven by an outlier country or year.  Only the value of 
the EMU coefficient, as well as its standard error, is reported in Tables 4 and 5.  
Remarkably, EMU remains robustly significant, regardless of the country and year 
excluded for both the 1992-2007 and 1979-2007 panels.  The EMU dummy’s 
significance drops below 99% when using the CSE estimator, yet on no occasion does 
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it fall below 95%.  The value of monetary union’s coefficient does not considerably 
differ from the baseline model, nor does it lose its significance, when Ireland, which 
witnessed the largest rise in relative public sector inflation after 1999 (see Table 1), is 
excluded.     
Table 4: Country Jack-knife results on EMU coefficient  
 
Country Excluded 
Base PCSE Model 
(1979-2007; 
N=348) 
Base PCSE Model 
(1991-2007; 
N=220) 
Base CSE Model 
(1991-2007; 
N=220) 
Australia 1.510*** 1.530*** 1.567*** 
  (0.416) (0.414) (0.517) 
Austria 1.581*** 1.395*** 1.426** 
  (0.412) (0.439) (0.566) 
Belgium 1.793*** 1.787*** 1.829*** 
  (0.439) (0.446) (0.471) 
Denmark 1.479*** 1.525*** 1.532** 
  (0.407) (0.427) (0.535) 
Finland 1.471*** 1.612*** 1.626** 
  (0.505) (0.545) (0.573) 
France 1.377*** 1.654*** 1.690** 
  (0.362) (0.375) (0.570) 
Germany 1.469*** 1.305*** 1.316** 
  (0.460) (0.499) (0.559) 
Ireland 1.321*** 1.316*** 1.341** 
  (0.355) (0.362) (0.512) 
Italy 1.910*** 1.695*** 1.731*** 
  (0.465) (0.427) (0.555) 
Japan 1.539*** 1.527*** 1.554** 
  (0.413) (0.441) (0.548) 
Netherlands 1.489*** 1.620*** 1.632** 
  (0.382) (0.455) (0.568) 
Sweden 1.379*** 1.271*** 1.293** 
  (0.392) (0.397) (0.500) 
UK 1.530*** 1.426*** 1.449** 
  (0.399) (0.413) (0.524) 
US 1.419*** 1.524*** 1.540** 
  (0.380) (0.412) (0.529) 
Monetary union’s beta coefficient from baseline model (Column I) from Tables 2 and 3 reported. 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  *, **, and *** indicate significance on a 90%, 95% and 
99% confidence level. 
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Table 5: Year Jack-knife results on EMU coefficient  
 
 
Year Excluded 
Base PCSE Model (1979-
2007; N=358) 
Base PCSE Model 
(1991-2007; 
N=223) 
Base CSE Model 
(1991-2007; 
N=223) 
1992 1.497*** 1.371*** 1.410** 
  (0.387) (0.368) (0.554) 
1993 1.463*** 1.365*** 1.386** 
  (0.398) (0.415) (0.568) 
1994 1.501*** 1.476*** 1.526*** 
  (0.374) (0.409) (0.495) 
1995 1.607*** 1.650*** 1.693*** 
  (0.391) (0.414) (0.529) 
1996 1.526*** 1.581*** 1.581*** 
  (0.405) (0.439) (0.482) 
1997 1.604*** 1.632*** 1.640** 
  (0.394) (0.433) (0.564) 
1998 1.520*** 1.625*** 1.631** 
  (0.402) (0.437) (0.564) 
1999 1.447*** 1.447*** 1.476** 
  (0.413) (0.429) (0.498) 
2000 1.548*** 1.559*** 1.592** 
  (0.397) (0.385) (0.561) 
2001 1.480*** 1.437*** 1.488*** 
  (0.392) (0.388) (0.478) 
2002 1.374*** 1.354*** 1.428** 
  (0.377) (0.376) (0.493) 
2003 1.494*** 1.496*** 1.540*** 
  (0.411) (0.437) (0.511) 
2004 1.576*** 1.662*** 1.686** 
  (0.401) (0.419) (0.594) 
2005 1.548*** 1.560*** 1.570** 
  (0.412) (0.442) (0.608) 
2006 1.641*** 1.733*** 1.719** 
  (0.419) (0.455) (0.655) 
2007 1.406*** 1.358*** 1.384*** 
  (0.394) (0.404) (0.434) 
Monetary union’s beta coefficient from baseline model (Column I) from Tables 2 and 3 reported. 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.  *, **, and *** indicate significance on a 90%, 95% and 
99% confidence level. 
To conclude, the empirics provided above lend support to the existence of a 
significant EMU trend-break.  Such an effect does not appear to be limited to a 
comparison with the Maastricht period, as the monetary union dummy continues to 
remain significant with the inclusion of the 1980s.  This empirical result is expected, 
considering that many EMU-candidate countries initiated fiscal adjustment to a hard 
currency policy and imposed moderation onto public employees during the 1980s.  
Based upon the results above, monetary union contributed, on average, to a 1.5% 
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increase in wage inflation divergence between the public and manufacturing sector 
within EMU member-states.  Lack of a significant time-trend indicates that this 
increase was EMU-specific; public sector unions in non-EMU member-states do not 
appear equally successful in outbidding their manufacturing counter-parts in one 
time period of the sample versus another.  The argument provided here to explain 
this divergence is an institutional one; monetary union removed critical constraints 
on public employers which enabled them to impose wage moderation upon the 
public sector.  Prior to 1998, hard currency commitments and the Maastricht criteria 
posed limitations on the wage increases that public employers could grant their 
employees.  With the disappearance of these constraints after 1999, public employers 
bargaining power waned significantly, leading to higher wage increases for the 
public sector, relative to that in manufacturing.  Such pay rises, should have 
translated towards higher inflation.  Yet what kept inflation stable throughout most 
of the EMU period was the exposed sector’s continued commitment to wage 
moderation.  In order to remain competitive within a single currency area, exposed 
sector wage setters were forced to internalise the public sectors’ abandonment of 
adjustment.    
 
IV.  Conclusion: Frieden’s dichotomy revisited 
Despite being a project that was widely supported by private employers across 
numerous candidate countries (Sandholtz, 1993; Verdun, 1996), EMU proved to be a 
Trojan Horse: it introduced a setting where sheltered sector unions were able to push 
for excessive wage settlements at the expense of their exposed (more business 
friendly) counter-parts.  It is no surprise that in countries where some level of public 
sector pay moderation was maintained, price competitiveness surged; between 1999 
and 2007, Germany and Austria, whose public sectors continued to exercise restraint, 
witnessed the highest export share growth in EMU.  For the majority of countries 
where public sector excess arose, however, the manufacturing sector was forced to 
compensate via significant deflation in order to remain competitive (Ireland, Finland 
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and the Netherlands).  Only in the south did wage-push also arise in the 
manufacturing, leading to a significant deterioration in its real exchange rate.  
Understanding EMU’s perverse effects on sector wage inflation, and the pressures it 
places on exposed sectors to compensate for lack of adjustment in sheltered ones, 
offers an novel perspective to the debate on macroeconomic policy and sectoral 
interests.  Frieden (1991) identified a monetary autonomy/exchange rate stability 
policy dichotomy based upon sectoral interests; internationally oriented producers 
hold greater preference for exchange rate stability, while sheltered producers desire 
monetary autonomy.  Sandholtz (1993) used Frieden’s dichotomy to outline why 
business interests highly favoured monetary union in the years before the 
formulation of the Maastricht Treaty; EMU safeguarded the creation of a major, 
stable currency, which would limit costs associated with trading in multiple, and 
volatile, currencies.   
However little analysis has been conducted on how Freiden’s dichotomy changes 
once monetary union comes into effect.  What is most ironic about Sandholtz’s 
discovery is that monetary union, unlike the EMS and Maastricht regimes where the 
public sector was held in check, holds exposed sectors hostage to inflationary wage 
settlements in sheltered ones via developments in the real exchange rate (RER).  
Exchange rate policy under EMU depends purely on relative inflation.  This becomes 
problematic, because, if public sector unions are in a position to secure inflationary 
wage settlements from their (weakened) employers, actors in the exposed sector 
must deflate their wages in order to retain a competitive RER.  Of course the exposed 
sector is not forced to make this adjustment if it is willing to see itself priced-out of 
international markets.  While extreme cases of public sector excesses (i.e. debt crises) 
would merit some level depreciation/devaluation in even the strictest currency 
regimes, bringing needed adjustment to the exposed sector, a currency union 
precludes such a possibility.  Rather, under monetary union, exposed sector interests 
are presented with a most unpleasant trade-off; either compensate for public sector 
wage excess and maintain competitiveness, or refuse to facilitate adjustment and 
accept an over-valued RER.  Under such terms, the current debt crises in the EMU’s 
Southern countries may hold a silver lining for their struggling manufacturing 
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sectors.  Externally-driven fiscal austerity pressures will provide needed adjustment 
to Southern public sectors, whose inflationary wage settlements have hampered 
national price-competitiveness for the preceding decade. 
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